ECE750: Usable Security and Privacy USEC Introduction

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




HUMANS AND CONTEXT

2

Usable Security and Privacy





People handle complex security decisions every day.

<u>Context</u> strongly impacts how we interpret signs like this one. Leave this Stick in Cloor!! The Locking Mechanism is broken From the inside! Ville Montée Will be called tomorrow for a repair. This.

Computers are bad at context

- Journalist mistakenly added to a sensitive chat
- Wrong phone number associated with a name in the phone book
- iPhone put it there....

Opinion Sport Culture Lifestyle

Signal group chat leak

Exclusive: how the Atlantic's Jeffrey Goldberg got added to the White House Signal group chat

Internal investigation cleared the national security adviser Mike Waltz, but the mistake was months in the making



Mike Waltz (left) and Jeffrey Goldberg. Composite: AP/Reuters

"According to the White House, the number was erroneously saved during a "contact suggestion update" by Waltz's iPhone, which one person described as the function where an iPhone algorithm adds a previously unknown number to an existing contact that it detects may be related."

created the group chat last month.

The "Citizens Bank" problem

XX Citizens[®]





I bank at Citizens Bank

https://www.citizensbank.com

https://www.citizensebank.com/



https://www.citizens-bank.com



https://www.citizensbank.net



https://www.ctznsbank.com

The "Citizens Bank" problem





https://www.citizensfb.com/

https://my.thecitizens.com

https://www.gocitizensbank.com

https://www.citizensalliancebank.com/

https://www.citizensbankwi.bank





https://www.cbbank.com/



Est. 1904





I bank at Citizens Bank

Human- and AI-facing URL features

Feature	Feature	Most popular	Use of the features			Criter	ria	
Category	Subcategory	feature	Automated	Human	Human	Time	Storage	Dependency
				education	support			
Lexical	Domain	Domain	Low	High	High	Low	Low	No
	Other URL components	Authentication	High	IVIIa	LOW	Low	Low	No
	Special Characters	Number of dots	High	T				
	Length	Length of URL	High					
	Numeric Representation	Raw IP address	High	Do	main is	s the	most	used
	Tokens & Keywords	Phishing keywords	High					
	Deviated domains	Similarity with PhishTank	High	tea	ture foi	r hun	ians, l	out is
	Embedded URL		Low		Imoot			A 1
Host	Whois	Domain age	Mid	E S	Imost	ignor	eaby	AI.
	DNS	No records	Mid					
	Connection	Connection speed	Mid					
Rank	Domain Popularity	Alexa Rank	High			Why'	?	
	PageRank	Google PageRank	High					
Redirection		No. of Redirections	Mid					
Certificate	Encryption	Is it HTTPS?	High	Hun	hans kr		ontex	t and
	Certificate values	Is EV?	Low					
Search Engines		Query the Full URL	Mid	th th	e Al sy	stem	does	not.
Black/White lists	Simple List	PhishTank	High					
	Proactive List	Blacklisting the IP	Mid					

Users are told to determine safety:

"only click on links ... if you are certain ... the content is safe."

"Safe" is defined as "going where you expect." Dr.Allen Cheng<nemuun@newcom.mn>

 $\odot \quad \leftarrow \quad \ll \quad \rightarrow \quad \diamondsuit \quad \cdots$ Wed 1/22/2025 06:07

To: kvaniea@inf.ed.ac.uk

DC

This email was sent to you by someone outside the University. You should only click on links or attachments if you are certain that the email is genuine and the content is safe.

Hello kvaniea,

I sent you a message a few hours ago but no reply yet, or you didn't receive it? I was wondering if there are any concerns that might have prevented you from responding.

Kindly read my letter and reply back. I want to make an inquiry


Thanks.

Dr.Allen Cheng

Human Resource Manager | Product Research Assistant FC Industrial Laboratories Ltd




Vaniea – IMPACT USA 2025



Who is the email claiming to be from?






University email address

	/
From John Doe <jdoe@sms.ed.a< th=""><th>c.uk>/ 11/05/18 06:59</th></jdoe@sms.ed.a<>	c.uk>/ 11/05/18 06:59
	11/03/18 00.35
To Undisclosed recipients:; 🏠	
To protect your privacy, Thunderbird has remote content in this message.	blocked <u>P</u> references ×
John Doe (jdoe@sms.ed.ac.uk) h with you. Kindly sign with your E-mail	
View The Shared F	<u>ile Here</u>
	© 2018 Dropbox
he University of Edinburgh is a charitabl cotland, with registration number SC00533	6.
http://card-rd.ga/clop/office/office/inde	ex.html
University is	Image

Vaniea – IMPACT USA 202





USA Phone

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Cancel	Payment	Login	
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Collect from	m station (i)		
То рау			
Booking fee		£0.80	
Total		£45.40	
Set up 🗯 Pay			
â Pay by card			
Pay with PayPal			
Login or Create a trainline account			
We'll send you personalised marketing, valuable discounts and great offers.			
	sonanseu marketing, v		

By booking your ticket you accept our Website Terms & Conditions and National Rail conditions of travel

Privacy policy applies

EU Phone

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To pay		
Booking fee		£0.75
•	discounts applied	
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Be first to hear		
	great discounts, sales	, offers and
more from	Trainline.	
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	ticket you accept our N d National Rail condit	

Well intentioned....



Use other sidewalk

All All Allant

CAUTION

NOVEMBER - APRIL

WINTER SEASON

USEC - Kami Va

There is no other sidewalk...


WHAT IS USABLE SECURITY AND PRIVACY?

Security and usability together

Security	Usability/HCI	Usable Security and Privacy
Humans are a secondary constraint to security constraints	Humans are the primary constraint, security rarely considered	Human factors and security are both primary constraints
Humans considered primarily in their role as adversaries/attackers	Concerned about human error but not human attackers	Concerned about both normal users and adversaries
Involves threat models	Involves task models, mental models, cognitive models	Involves threat models AND task models, mental models, etc.
Focus on security metrics	Focus on usability metrics	Considers usability and security metrics together
User studies rarely done	User studies common	User studies common, often involve deception + active adversary

PassFaces

- Users have a set of faces instead of a set of numbers/letters as their password
- Humans are better at recognizing things than they are at recalling information
- High feature information, like faces, are theoretically easier to recognize



Graphical Passwords

Users select 5 points on the image in order.






User-selected graphical passwords

Security	Usability/HCI	Usable Security and Privacy
What is the space of possible	How difficult is it for a user to	All the security/privacy and
passwords?	create, remember, and enter a	usability HCI questions
	graphical password? How long	
How can we make the password	does it take?	How do users select graphical
space larger to make the		passwords? How can we help
password harder to guess?	How hard is it for users to learn	them choose passwords harder
	the system?	for attackers to predict?
How are the stored passwords		
secured?	Are users motivated to put in	As the password space
	effort to create good passwords?	increases, what are the impacts
Can an attacker gain knowledge		on usability factors and
by observing a user entering	Is the system accessible using a	predictability of human
their password?	variety of devices, for users with	selection?
	disabilities?	

Based on slides by Lorrie Cranor

Defining Security

- Confidentiality
 - Ensures that computer-related assets are accessed only by authorized parties.
- Integrity
 - Assets can be modified only by authorized parties or only in authorized ways.
- Availability
 - Assets are accessible to authorized parties at appropriate times.



Security properties to ensure

Confidentiality No improper information gathering

Integrity Data has not been (maliciously) altered

Availability Data/services can be accessed as desired

Accountability Actions are traceable to those responsible

Authentication User or data origin accurately identifiable

Is this system secure?

- Confidentiality
 - Device might collect data from card like name and card number.
 - Possibly auto-sign people up for marketing.

• Integrity

• How will you be sure that amount charged really is \$10?

Availability

- Minimal availability issues because the machine does not take the card away.
- Minor risk of fraud alert.




Is this system secure?

- Confidentiality
 - Device might collect data from card like name and card number.
 - Possibly auto-sign people up for marketing. (Unlikely with GDPR)
- Integrity
 - How will you be sure that amount charged really is £3?
- Availability
 - Minimal availability issues, user never looses control of the card.
 - Minor risk of fraud alert.



Is this system secure?

- Confidentiality
 - Probably fine
- Integrity
 - Maybe
- Availability
 - Big problem



Defining privacy

- The Cambridge Dictionary

- Someone's right to keep their personal matters and relationships secret
 - Controlling personal information
 - The new law is designed to protect people's privacy

- The state of being alone
 - Controlling access to self
 - I hate sharing a bedroom I never get any privacy



Controlling who has personal information





Controlling access to self



Think-pair-share

- **Think** about the question to yourself quietly. No talking.
 - 1 minute
- **Pair** with someone sitting near you. Discuss the question and your answers. Lots of everyone talking.
 - 3 minutes
- **Share** through whole-class discussion. A couple groups share their answers and the instructor comments. A couple people talk.
 - About 5 minutes



Uninvited Guests https://vimeo.com/128873380


Human-factors Engineering

- human-factors engineering, science dealing with the application of information on physical and psychological characteristics to the design of devices and systems for human use.¹
- Humans are a part of a larger system.
- Human-factors engineers build systems that account for human limitations and support humans in completing tasks with minimal errors.




Example: calculators vs phones

- Order of the numbers are reversed on phone and calculator
- Extensive testing found that people made fewer dialing errors this way




Some human factors can be computed based on physical characteristics.



35

Goals, Operations, Methods, and Selection rules (GOMS)



Compare speed of two designs for experts

Design A: drag the file into the trash can ^[29]	Design B: use the short cut "control + T" ^[30]	
method encoding (operator sequence) ^[31]	method encoding (operator sequence) ^[32]	
	1. initiate the deletion (M)	
1. initiate the deletion (M)	2. find the icon for the to-be-deleted file (M)	
2. find the file icon (M)	3. point to file icon (P)	
3. point to file icon (P)	4. press mouse button (B)	
4. press and hold mouse button (B)	5. release mouse button (B)	
5. drag file icon to trash can icon (P)	6. move hand to keyboard (H)	
6. release mouse button (B)	7. press control key (K)	
7. point to original window (P)	8. press T key (K)	
	9. move hand back to mouse (H)	
Total time	Total time	
3P + 2B + 2M = 3*1.1 sec + 2*.1 sec+ 2*1.35	P + 2B + 2H + 2K + 2M = 1.1 sec + 2*.1 sec + 2*.4 sec + 2*.2 sec +	
sec = 6.2 sec	2*1.35 sec = 5.2 sec	

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keystroke-level_model

Human Variability

Variability Type	Description	Security Impact
Cognitive	Differences in thinking and information processing	Affects alert comprehension and response time
Behavioral	Varied actions and response patterns	Influences compliance with security protocols
Technical Skill	Different levels of technical experience and knowledge	Determines ability to implement security measures
Emotional	Psychological and stress responses	Impacts decision quality during security incidents



Heavily inspired by Dr Calvin Nobles IMPACT 2025 talk

Error Management Science in Cybersecurity

Decision Errors

Poor choices despite having correct information.
Often arise from cognitive biases or pressure.

Perceptual Errors

 Misinterpreting security information. Common with complex dashboards, lots of alerts, or complex interfaces


Skill-Based Errors

 Failures in execution despite proper intent. Typically occur during routine security tasks.


Routine Violations

 Deliberately bypassing security protocols. Often due to efficiency-security tradeoffs.

Heavily inspired by Dr Calvin Nobles IMPACT 2025 talk



Operationalizing Human Factors Engineering



Design Integration


Implementing human-centered solutions into the system's design.

Evaluation

Testing effectiveness against human performance metrics.

Heavily inspired by Dr Calvin Nobles IMPACT 2025 talk

Double Dimond



https://www.gilero.com/resources/understanding-human-centered-design/

Usability (Human-Factors)

- Learn-ability The type for typical users to learn the actions relevant to a set of tasks.
- Efficiency How long it takes users to perform typical tasks.
- **Errors** The rate of errors users make when performing tasks.
- **Memorability** How users can retain their knowledge of the system over time.
- **Subjective Satisfaction** How users like the various aspects of the system.

Designing the user interface: Strategies for Effective Human-Computer Interaction by Ben Shnelderman



Usability (Human-Factors)

- The rental car navigation system is likely setup for a single user with rare configuration needs – set it and forget it
- Security and privacy issues coming from:
 - Logs
 - Sensors
 - Configuration settings
 - Connection to user's devices (Bluetooth)

Designing the user interface: Strategies for Effective Human-Computer Interaction by Ben Shnelderman



Usability


- Learn-ability Will the user learn that security options exist?
- Efficiency How long do users *think* it will take to perform security tasks?
- **Errors** Will users notice that security settings need attention? If they do, will they make the correct changes?
- Memorability Does this system use similar configuration such that users can transfer knowledge?
- **Subjective Satisfaction** Do users feel like they successfully protected themselves?

Designing the user interface: Strategies for Effective Human-Computer Interaction by Ben Shnelderman



USec is where security and the real world meet.

It is VERY interdisciplinary



WHAT IS SO CHALLENGING ABOUT USEC?

BILL GATES: TRUSTWORTHY COMPUTING

*This is the e-mail Bill Gates sent to every full-time employee at Microsoft, in which he describes the company's new strategy emphasizing security in its products.*From: Bill Gates

Sent: Tuesday, January 15, 2002 5:22 PM To: Microsoft and Subsidiaries: All FTE Subject: Trustworthy computing

Every few years I have sent out a memo talking about the highest priority for Microsoft. Two years ago, it was the kickoff of our .NET strategy. Before that, it was several memos about the importance of the Internet to our future and the ways we could make the Internet truly useful for people. Over the last year it has become clear that ensuring .NET is a platform for Trustworthy Computing is more important than any other part of our work. If we don't do this, people simply won't be willing – or able – to take advantage of all the other great work we do. Trustworthy Computing is the highest priority for all the work we are doing. We must lead the industry to a whole new level of Trustworthiness in computing. Security: The data our software and services store on behalf of our customers should be protected from harm and used or modified only in appropriate ways. Security models should be easy for developers to understand and build into their applications.

Privacy: Users should be in control of how their data is used. Policies for information use should be clear to the user. Users should be in control of when and if they receive information to make best use of their time. It should be easy for users to specify appropriate use of their information including controlling the use of email they send.

Trustworthiness is a much broader concept than security, and winning our customers' trust involves more than just fixing bugs and achieving "five-nines" availability. It's a fundamental challenge that spans the entire computing ecosystem, from individual chips all the way to global Internet services. It's about smart software, services and industry-wide cooperation. "In the rush to build Internet businesses, many executives concentrate all their attention on attracting customers rather than retaining them. That's a mistake. The unique economics of e-business make customer loyalty more important than ever."

E-Loyalty

Your Secret Weapon on the Web

In the rush to build Internet businesses, many executives concentrate all their attention on attracting customers rather than retaining them. That's a mistake. The unique economics of e-business make customer loyalty more important than ever.

by Frederick F. Reichheld and Phil Schefter

OYALTY MAY NOT BE THE FIRST idea that pops into your head when you think about electronic commerce. After all, what relevance could such a quaint, oldfashioned notion hold for a world in which customers defect at the click of a mouse and impersonal shopping bots scour databases for ever better deals? What good is a small-town virtue amid the faceless anonymity of the Internet's global marketplace? Loyalty must be on a fast track toward extinction, right?

Not at all. Chief executives at the cutting edge of e-commerce-from Dell Computer's Michael Dell to eBay's Meg Whitman, from Vanguard's Jack Brennan to Grainger's Richard Keyser-care deeply about customer retention and consider it vital to the success of their on-line operations. They know that loyalty

ILLUSTRATION BY DOUGLAS JOI

"On the Web ... business is conducted at a distance and risks and uncertainties are magnified... Customers can't look a salesclerk in the eye, can't size up the physical space of a store or office, and can't see and touch products. They have to rely on images and promises, and if they don't trust the company presenting those images and promises, they'll shop elsewhere."



Your Secret Weapon on the Web

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- Will people understand encryption?
- What icons work well?
- What is the most important information?
- Does Green/Red have the same meaning world wide?
- Will anyone look at the address bar after loading?
- Will users trust the icon to be accurate?

Questions