

Cooper: Task Colocation with Cooperative Games


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Presented by: Qiuyun Llull

Duke University

HPCA – Feb 7, 2017




Task Colocation in Datacenters



Datacenters colocate applications to increase server utilization




Colocation Contention



Colocation interference can lead to performance degradation









System Setting




- Alvin, Ben, and Dan are working towards HPCA papers.
- They share a cluster and divide processors equally.
- Ben's applications are memory intensive.
- Alvin and Dan's applications are not memory intensive.



System Setting






Strategic Behavior



- Alvin, Ben, and Dan are strategic.
- Can smaller, separate clusters improve performance?
- Alvin and Dan share separate cluster to improve performance.



Strategic Behavior



Strategic Behavior

Without incentives, strategic users may...

- Bypass common management policy
- Migrate tasks for better colocations
- Procure private machines

Strategic action fragments cluster and harms efficiency



Prior Research

Pursues Performance

- Predicts contention quickly and accurately
- Colocates tasks for system performance
- Colocates tasks with complementary demands

Neglects Incentives

- Overlooks strategic behavior
- Fails to encourage users to colocate



Incentivizing Colocation

Stability

- No group of users break away to form separate system

Satisfied Preferences

- More users colocate with preferred tasks

Fair Attribution of Costs

- Users that contribute more to contention suffer higher losses




Example

Disutility (Slow-Down %)

User	Co-Runner			
	A	B	C	D
A		1.5	4.9	9.3
B	1.8		3.9	12.7
C	0.0	0.3		32.8
D	3.8	5.3	1.0	



Performance



Preferences

A : B > C > D
B : A > C > D
C : A > B > D
D : C > A > B




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Performance




Preferences

A: **B** > C > **D**
 B: **A** > **C** > D
 C: A > **B** > **D**
 D: **C** > **A** > B



Fairness



Cooper

A framework that incentivizes strategic users to colocate by providing desirable system outcomes:

- Stability
- Satisfied Preferences
- Fair Attribution of Costs




Agenda

- System Setting
- Incentivizing Colocation
- Cooper Colocation Framework
- Evaluation




Cooperative Game

- Strategic agents are users and tasks
- Utility is task performance
- Colocation preferences describe preferred co-runners
 - If $u(A,B) > u(A,C)$, then A prefers B over C
- Actions are -- participate or break away




Game Equilibrium


Colocations are stable when no group of users can improve their performance by changing colocation.





Cooper Framework



Colocation Policies



Matching people in life



Stable Matching

Algorithm partitions tasks into two sets

- Tasks in one set propose.
- Tasks in other set accepts, rejects.

Task updates co-runners


- Accept proposal if performance improves

Algorithm terminates when all tasks matched

- [1] D. Gale and L. Shapley, “College admissions and the stability of marriage,” *American Mathematical Monthly*, 1962.
[2] R.W.Irving, “An efficient algorithm for the stable roommates problem,” *Journal of Algorithms*, pp. 577–595, 1985.



Stable Matching



Stable Policies

Stable Marriage Random (SMR)

- Partition tasks randomly

Stable Marriage Partition (SMP)

- Partition tasks with domain-specific knowledge
- Memory-intensive tasks propose

Stable Roommate (SR)

- No partition
- Any task proposes to any other.



Baseline Policies

Greedy (GR)


- Colocate tasks to minimize performance loss

Complementary (CO)

- Colocate tasks with complementary resource demands



Preference Predictor




Preference Predictor

- Profile colocation performance with sparse samples
- Rate co-runners with profiles
- Predict ratings with collaborative filtering
 - Infer ratings based on task similarity
 - Suppose A: $B > C$ and A is similar to D
 - Then D: $B > C$
- Construct preference list per task based on ratings



Action Recommender




Action Recommender

- Assess assigned matches for each task
- Search preference list for better co-runners
 - Suppose X: $A > B$, and X matched to B
 - X messages A to suggest new match
- Recommend break away
 - Suppose A also prefers X over assigned match.
 - X, A should break away



Cooper Recap



Agenda

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- Cooper Colocation Framework
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Experimental Methods

Workloads

- PARSEC for multithreaded benchmarks
- Spark for task-parallel machine learning

System Measurements



- 10 nodes, each with 2 processors and 24 cores
- Two tasks share a processor each with half the cores

System Simulation

- 500 nodes with varied task populations
- Simulate colocations with system profiles



Fair Attribution of Costs




x-axis sorts applications by memory intensity

Tasks that contribute more to contention suffer higher penalties




Satisfied Preferences



More users collocate with preferred tasks.




Stability



Fewer users break away to form separate system



Performance



Stable colocations preserve system performance



More in the paper ...

Cooper Implementation

- Profiler and preference predictor
- Adapted matching algorithms
- Action recommender and job dispatcher

Cooperative Game Theory

- Shapely value for fair division
- Extending beyond pairs

Experimental Results

- Sensitivity to system scale and job mix
- Comprehensive policy comparisons



Conclusion

Cooperative Games for Shared Systems

- Formalize interactions between strategic users
- Incentivize user participation
- Enable fair task colocation

Management Desiderata

- Fair attribution of costs
- Satisfied preferences
- Stability

Fairness versus Performance

- Stable colocations satisfy more users
- Stable colocations preserve system performance



Q & A

Thank you!

