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“Ensuring correct cryptographic algorithm and provider usage at compile time” by W. Xing, Y. Cheng, and W. Dietl.

Abstract

Using cryptographic APIs to encrypt and decrypt data, calculate digital signatures, or compute hashes is error prone. Weak or unsupported cryptographic algorithms can cause information leakage and runtime exceptions, such as a NoSuchAlgorithmException in Java. Using the wrong cryptographic service provider can also lead to unsupported cryptographic algorithms. Moreover, for Android developers who want to store their key material in the Android Keystore, misused cryptographic algorithms and providers make the key material unsafe. We present the Crypto Checker, a pluggable type system that detects the use of forbidden algorithms and providers at compile time. For typechecked code, the Crypto Checker guarantees that only trusted algorithms and providers are used, and thereby ensures that the cryptographic APIs never cause runtime exceptions or use weak algorithms or providers. The Crypto Checker is easy-to-use: it allows developers to determine which algorithms and providers are permitted by writing specifications using type qualifiers. We implemented the Crypto Checker for Java and evaluated it with 32 open-source Java applications (over 2 million LOC). We found 2 issues that cause runtime exceptions and 62 violations of security recommendations and best practices. We also used the Crypto Checker to analyze 65 examples from a public benchmark of hard security issues and discuss the differences between our approach and a different static analysis in detail.

BibTeX entry:

@article{XingCD21,
   author = {W. Xing and Y. Cheng and W. Dietl},
   title = {{Ensuring correct cryptographic algorithm and provider usage
        at compile time}},
}

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